Conversational Eliciture by Cohen, Jonathan & Kehler, Andrew
Conversational Eliciture∗
Jonathan Cohen†and Andrew Kehler‡
It is an obvious point that the apparatus of model-theoretic semantics is not sufficient to
predict the choice of a particular description of an object from among many semantically
suitable ones [Suppes, 1973, 393].
Abstract
The sentence The boss fired the employee who is always late invites the
defeasible inference that the speaker is attempting to convey that the
lateness caused the firing (cf. The boss fired the employee who is from
Philadelphia, which does not invite an analogous inference). We argue
that such inferences cannot be understood in terms of familiar ap-
proaches to extrasemantic enrichment such as implicature, impliciture,
explicature, or species of local enrichment already in the literature.
Rather, we propose that they arise from more basic cognitive strategies,
grounded in processes of coherence establishment, that thinkers use
to make sense of the world. Attention to such cases provides a richer
and more varied landscape of extrasemantic enrichment than has been
appreciated to date.
1 Pragmatic enrichment
Zipf [1949] famously posited two opposing desiderata in language design. The
first is what he called the AUDITOR ’S ECONOMY, which concerns the desideratum
of EXPRESSIVENESS: Languages should be expressive enough that hearers can
recover the speaker’s message with minimal interpretive effort. The second is
the SPEAKER ’S ECONOMY, which amounts to the desideratum of EFFICIENCY:
Languages should allow speakers to get their message across with minimal
articulatory effort. One way that speakers manage to be economical while
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remaining expressive is by designing their utterances to take advantage of the
hearer’s mental state and capacity for inference to communicate more than what is
explicitly said. That is, speakers can, in certain cases, rely on their hearer’s ability
to perform PRAGMATIC ENRICHMENT to recover content that a speaker intends to
convey; in such cases the speaker can avoid having to convey the content explicitly.
The source of such pragmatically-determined aspects of sentence meaning has
occupied the attention of researchers interested in the semantics and pragmatics of
language for many years, and became an industry of its own after the seminal work
of Grice [1975]. The goal of theories of pragmatic enrichment is to offer accounts
of the myriad of ways in which language interpreters come to identify elements of
the message that a speaker intends to convey that go beyond the literal meaning
associated with her linguistic contribution. Theories of enrichment have thereby
historically engaged with several questions. First, theories typically provide a
characterization of the type of enrichment at hand, as means for identifying those
components of conveyed content that qualify as having resulted from that type of
enrichment. Second, when applicable, they identify those aspects of the hearer’s
cognitive apparatus that a speaker exploits when constructing her utterance so
as to convey the enrichment. Third, they characterize (as explicitly as possible)
the nature of the inference processes associated with that cognitive apparatus
that the hearer uses to recover the enrichments. Finally, they characterize the
triggers (linguistic or not) responsible for the hearer’s initiation of those inferential
processes, when applicable.
Answers to these questions are necessary if one is to understand both the
cognitive basis of a particular species of enrichment and the rationale for the
classification of different types of enrichment into distinct categories. For instance,
in positing his notion of IMPLICATURE (§2.1), Grice provides answers to all four of
the aforementioned questions, describing a rational reconstruction of an inferential
process that yields implicit conveyed propositions through a process triggered
by the threat of communicative failure, in light of mutual assumptions about the
interlocutors’ rationality and cooperativity. While endorsing a Gricean framework
at a general level, Bach differentiates his notion of IMPLICITURE from implicature
by pointing to differences in both the types of communicative failure serving as
the trigger and the nature of the inferences themselves (i.e., serving to narrow
the meaning of an explicitly conveyed proposition rather than yielding a distinct
proposition that sits alongside an explicitly conveyed one; see §2.2). Researchers
investigating forms of local pragmatic strengthening (§2.3) have likewise argued
for differentiations based on the local nature of the enrichments and other factors.
Detailed theories of enrichment that engage with these questions are necessary if
we are to understand the full range of respects with which languages have evolved
to balance expressiveness with efficiency.
In this paper, we focus on a process by which extrasemantic content is conveyed
that, we claim, fails to fit neatly into any of the types of pragmatic enrichment thus
far described in the literature. To see the kinds of cases we have in mind, consider
examples (1a-c):
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(1) a. The company fired the manager who was embezzling money. [Rohde et al.,
2011]
b. The company fired the manager who was hired in 2002.
c. The company fired the manager who has a long history of corporate awards.
In uttering example (1a), a speaker strongly invites the hearer to infer that she
intends to communicate not only that the manager was embezzling and was fired,
but that the embezzlement was the reason for the firing.1 Note that this is merely
a defeasible inference: (1a) could be followed with The reason the manager was fired
was because he was rude and always late. In (1b), however, being hired in 2002 will
normally not be understood to be the cause of the firing; here the relative clause is
merely identificational. Example (1c) is a case that leads to a counter-to-expectation
inference, leading the hearer to wonder why a manager with a positive history with
the company would be fired.2
The differences in the interpretations of (1a-c) hinge on the choice of relative
clause used in a referring expression. Similar inferences derive from other
aspects of referring expressions as well, including the content of adjectival phrases.
Example (2a), for instance, will generally be taken to indicate that the drugs caused
the undergrad to fall off of the cliffs:
(2) a. The drug-addled undergrad fell off of the Torrey Pines cliffs. (adapted
from an example of Webber [1991])
1For ease of exposition, in what follows we may at times speak in terms of utterances
inviting addressees to infer some content X , when what addressees actually infer is that the
speaker intends to communicate X , since understanding the content of a message does not
require accepting/endorsing its content. It is this latter interpretation we intend. Thanks to
Kent Bach for a discussion of this point. We further elaborate on the relationship between
the speaker and hearer in making such inferences in §3.1.
2 The existence of these inferences was confirmed by a Mechanical Turk passage
completion experiment. Participants (n = 17) were provided with sentences like those
in (1a–c), which included object-biased implicit causality verbs [Garvey et al., 1976,
Caramazza et al., 1977, inter alia], and whose object NPs included relative clauses that
were independently judged as encoding an explanation for the event described (type Expl,
as in 1a), neutral (type NoExpl, as in 1b), or expectation-violating (type ViolExp, as in 1c).
Participants supplied a follow-on sentence to complete the passage, and two annotators
blind to the hypothesis coded the data. Contexts with implicit causality verbs in such
studies have been previously shown to yield a substantial percentage of completions that
provide an explanation (i.e., cause or reason) for the described event [Kehler et al., 2008]. But
if participants inferred the relative clause to provide an explanation in the Expl condition,
we predict that participants would provide fewer completions that provide explanations
in this condition than the other two. This is indeed what we found: Participants wrote
fewer explanations in the Expl condition (38.9%) compared to the NoExpl condition (75.4%;
p < .001) and the ViolExp condition (65.2%; p < .001). See also Rohde et al. [2011]
and Kehler and Rohde [2019] for experimental studies that utilize examples like (1a-b) to
demonstrate how the inference of an explanation from a relative clause influences relative
clause attachment and pronoun interpretation respectively.
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b. The well-liked undergrad fell off of the Torrey Pines cliffs.
c. The normally risk-averse undergrad fell off of the Torrey Pines cliffs.
No such inference is typically drawn for (2b), however: presumably being well-
liked was not a cause of the falling. And again, (2c) yields a counter-to-expectation
inference, leading one to be surprised that a normally risk-averse undergrad would
fall off of the cliffs.
Finally, extrasemantic inferences may result from the choice of nominal itself;
consider (3a-b):
(3) a. A jogger was hit by a car in Fresno last night. [Hobbs, 1990]
b. A farmer was hit by a car in Fresno last night.
The use of the NP a jogger in example (3a) strongly invites the hearer to infer, but
does not entail, that the the victim was jogging at the time of the accident, and
hence is not merely someone who happens to jog a lot (but who was walking or
bicycling when the accident occurred). In contrast, the analogous inference for (3b)
—that the farmer was farming at the time of the accident— is much less naturally
evoked, and indeed the utterance is completely felicitous without it.3
The property common to these examples is that a speaker’s decision to use a
particular way of referring to an entity over other alternatives invites the hearer to
draw inferences that, crucially, are not triggered by any syntactic relationship or
other type of felicity requirement on linguistic material. For want of an appropriate
term of art, we brand this phenomenon ELICITURE, a term intended to capture
the fact that, by choosing a particular form of reference, a speaker elicits inferences
on the part of the hearer that would not otherwise be drawn. In this paper, we will
argue that the inferences under scrutiny differ in crucial ways from other forms of
enrichment that have been posited in the literature with respect to the questions
3One might object that what we are construing as an interesting disanalogy between
cases that invite an extrasemantic inference (e.g., 3a) and those that don’t (e.g., 3b) is more
simply understood by noting that the nominal a jogger admits of a stage-level interpretation
more readily than the corresponding nominal a farmer. However, we see this difference as a
redescription of, and not an alternative explanation for, our observation. For an inference
that the activity connected with the nominal was occurring at the time of the matrix event
will necessarily imply temporariness for that activity—which just amounts to the stage-
level interpretation. It is worth noting that these temporal properties are not inherent to the
nominals themselves: The sentence Fred talked to a jogger at the party last night does not readily
evoke the inference that the jogger was jogging at the time (Fred’s interlocutor is likely a
hobbyist), which in turn entails an individual-level interpretation, whereas the sentence
A farmer flipped over his tractor yesterday afternoon does trigger an extrasemantic inference
analogous to (3a), yielding a stage-level interpretation. What cries out for explanation, then,
is just why these nominals can be used with a stage-level interpretation in just those cases in
which the extrasemantic inference is licensed. In what follows we’ll be attempting to answer
this and similar questions in general pragmatic terms. (Thanks to Martin Schäfer and Chris
Kennedy for pressing us on this point.)
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outlined at the outset. Indeed, we emphasize that what is inferred in these cases
does not result from presumptions about conversational norms that cooperative
interlocutors are presumed to follow, nor do they involve the recovery of a value for
an unsaturated (explicit or hidden) parameter, a strengthening of the meaning of a
particular constituent, nor a filling out of an otherwise underspecified logical form.
On the contrary, the inferred information in our examples —e.g., the information
that, with respect to (1a), the embezzlement was the reason for the firing— is not
a necessary component of, and appears to go well beyond, the logical form of
the sentences that invite these inferences. Examples of eliciture reveal particular
way in which a speaker’s choice of referential expression can be used to exploit
the hearer’s world knowledge and capacity for inference as a way to make her
linguistic contribution more efficient as a vehicle for communicating content. The
question, however, is exactly how these inferences come to be drawn by the hearer.
Whereas examples of this sort have been noted in the literature for some time (as
the citations for examples (1)–(3) make clear), we aim to show that their place in,
and ramifications for, pragmatic theory have not been fully appreciated.
Our strategy will be as follows. Below, we briefly describe some of the
more familiar categories of pragmatic enrichment that have been proposed in the
literature, and explain why elicitures constitute a distinct species (§2). We then
follow with a detailed characterization of elicitures that answers the key questions
to be addressed by a theory of enrichment as outlined above (§3). Finally, we revisit
the place of elicitures in a general theory of pragmatics (§4).
2 Familiar approaches
A natural reaction to the examples in §1 is the thought that they can be assimilated
to standard forms of extrasemantic content that have become familiar in the
literature. Though understandable, we believe this strategy is unsuccessful—for,
we aim to show, our examples reveal aspects of extrasemantic enrichment that go
beyond familiar accounts.
2.1 Implicature
Grice (1975), of course, introduced the notion of implicature to describe the
communication of extrasemantic content. Are the extrasemantic inferences in (1)–
(3) the result of implicature? An initial examination might suggest that they are.
After all, these inferences turn on the form of referring expression chosen by a
speaker, and Grice himself noted that such choices can give rise to extrasemantic
inferences that have the hallmarks of implicature. Considering the utterance X is
meeting a woman this evening, he suggests that “a speaker would normally implicate
that the person to be met was someone other than X’s wife, mother, sister, or
perhaps even close platonic friend” (p. 56). Evidence that implicatures are at play
in such cases is provided by the hallmark diagnostics of CANCELABILITY and
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REINFORCEABILITY [Grice, 1975, Horn, 1984, Sadock, 1978, Hirschberg, 1991],
illustrated respectively in (4a-b):
(4) a. John is meeting a woman this evening, in fact she’s his wife.
b. John is meeting a woman this evening, but not his wife.
That is, the implicature that the woman X is meeting is not his wife is canceled
without contradiction in (4a) and likewise reinforced without redundancy in (4b),
establishing that the inference is in fact not part of what is said. Suggestively, the
same tests succeed for the cases under scrutiny here, e.g. (1a):
(5) a. The company fired the manager who was embezzling money, but the
embezzlement isn’t why he got fired.
b. The company fired the manager who was embezzling money, and in
fact the embezzlement is why he got fired.
Hence, these considerations naturally invite the suspicion that the extrasemantic
inferences witnessed in examples (1a/2a/3a) are similarly the result of implica-
tures.4
4 Kronfeld [1990, p. 92] in fact offered a Gricean explanation of an extrasemantic contrast
present in a conceptually similar but more restricted class of cases. Assume for illustrative
purposes that Washington D.C. is both the city with the greatest diversity of languages
spoken and also the murder capital of the world, and in which its mayor opens a meeting
of the Linguistics Society of America with one of the utterances (6a-c):
(6) a. Washington D.C. welcomes the meeting of the Linguistic Society of America.
b. The city with the greatest diversity of languages spoken welcomes the meeting of
the Linguistic Society of America.
c. The murder capital of the world welcomes the meeting of the Linguistic Society of
America.
(See Grice [1978, 114] for a similar example.) Kronfeld proposes to explain the difference in
pragmatic effects in (6a-b) by claiming that a hearer will regard the referring expression used
in the subject position of (6b) as a needlessly/irrelevantly prolix, and hence Quantity- and
Manner-violating, version of that which appears in (6a), and attempt to restore conformity
with that norm by establishing the ‘conversational relevance’ of the referring expression,
by way of identifying an intensionally justified universal generalization that the utterance
could be understood to express, such as that in (7a).
(7) a. In view of f , any city with the greatest diversity of languages spoken must
welcome the meeting of the Linguistic Society of America. [f=the fact that
linguists like to encounter linguistic diversity]
b. In view of f , any murder capital of the world must welcome the meeting of the
Linguistic Society of America. [f=?]
By the same logic, the oddity of (6c) results from the hearer’s inability to identify a plausible,
suitable universal generalization of this sort (7b).
We see a number of problems with Kronfeld’s implementation, many of which arise from
the restriction of his analysis to simple predicational sentences with definite descriptions
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To be sure, the phenomenon of eliciture can be brought under a Gricean um-
brella if one takes a sufficiently broad view of what counts as Gricean enrichment
as to include any form of meaning expansion that the speaker intends the hearer
to recover: our cases clearly share many relevant features with other, previously
documented types of enrichment.5 On the other hand, part of what makes Grice’s
contribution so important is that he goes beyond this broad view of implicature to
provide specific answers to the questions outlined in the introduction. And from
this perspective, we can see that eliciture differs from implicature (and for that
matter, impliciture; see §2.2) in crucial respects that adequate theories of pragmatic
enrichment must recognize.
As we understand him, Grice [1975, pp. 49–50] proposes that an enrichment
counts as an implicature if it could be reached (in his words, “worked out”) by
a hearer through a version of the following four step procedure. First, when
the speaker utters a string, the listener recovers its literal semantic content p (by
exercise of his semantic competence, plus perhaps mechanisms for disambiguation,
and for assigning values to various context-dependent elements demanding
contextual supplementation). Second, he notices that the expression by the speaker
of the content p in the circumstances would violate one or more Gricean norms.
Third, since he takes it that speakers ordinarily abide by these norms, he infers that
the utterance must have as a secondary purpose the conveyance of some distinct,
extrasemantic content q whose expression by the speaker is in compliance with
Gricean norms. And fourth, he therefore treats the utterance as conveying the
content q (in addition to the content p).
A crucial feature of this account is that, as presented, implicature rests in
an important way on a threat of failure—specifically on the idea that, without
the extrasemantic enrichment, the speaker’s utterance would violate assumptions
about her conformity to rational and/or cooperative norms.6 In contrast, we argue
as subject terms. As our examples make clear, the phenomenon extends to many other
constructions —including indefinites (e.g., in (3)), adjectival phrases occurring within
definite descriptions (e.g., in (2)), and relative clauses (e.g., in (1))— and it is far from clear
how his analysis can be made to extend to such cases. However, we will forgo elaboration
of our arguments against his particular analysis in favor of ones that apply to any Gricean
analysis of eliciture, which includes Kronfeld’s more limited treatment.
5Thus, our approach is broadly Gricean in just the way that Bach says his approach to
the newly proposed category of impliciture is:
What makes my approach Gricean is essentially this: in figuring out what a
speaker means an addressee presumes that the speaker intends him to figure
this out [Bach, 2010, p. 3].
Here, Bach emphasizes the crucial role of the recognition of communicative intentions in the
conveyance of impliciture, while at the same time arguing that impliciture is fundamentally
distinct from implicature. We follow a parallel strategy for eliciture here.
6 Several colleagues (Emma Borg, Alexander Dinges, Chris Kennedy) have suggested to
us that Grice himself appears to have endorsed the idea that implicature need not rest on
norm-violations, citing the first pair of examples he offers after characterizing the notion of
conversational implicature: “Group A: Examples in which no maxim is violated, or at least
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that elicitures neither rest on the threat of communicative failure nor engage
assumptions about speaker rationality and/or cooperativity in the same manner.
To illustrate our point, it will prove useful to step through possible analyses that
appeal to one or more of Grice’s four maxims. This notwithstanding, we wish
to stress that the arguments ultimately apply more generally; they cannot be
overcome via the inclusion of additional maxims beyond Grice’s repetoire.7
We see no obvious strategy for pursuing an explanation of eliciture based on the
maxims of Quality or Quantity. As noted in fn. 4, Kronfeld previously addressed
a related set of cases by way of violations of the prolixity submaxim of Manner,
so we briefly consider this strategy first. Whereas we find his approach to the
sorts of cases he addresses appealing, it is easy to see that prolixity in the face of a
salient alternative expression is not necessary to trigger the inference to an eliciture.
For instance, consider a situation in which a speaker and hearer at a company are
aware of another employee, and where, while they do not know his name, they
share knowledge of various of his characteristics, including that he has red hair, a
in which it is not clear that any maxim is violated” (p. 32). (This suggestion is developed by
Dinges [2015].)
However, our understanding of Grice on this point is that this characterization applies to
these cases after the meaning of the utterance is modified so as to bring the utterance into
norm-compliance. That is, as we read him, Grice’s position is that there would be a clash
between what is conveyed and the Relation maxim, were it not that (“B would be infringing
. . . unless . . . ” (p. 32)) the hearer can safely attribute further assumptions (which therefore
gain the status of implicata) to the speaker: “In both examples, the speaker implicates
that which he must be assumed to believe in order to preserve the assumption that he is
observing the maxim of relation” (p. 32). This contrasts with what happens in examples in
Groups B and C, where a maxim remains violated after the implicature is drawn—either
because of a clash with another maxim (Group B) or because the maxim is flouted (Group
C). On this characterization, therefore, implicatures do indeed arise from threatened norm
violations. This contrasts with elicitures, which, we claim, need not rest on a threatened
norm violation or other linguistic lapse.
7We again appeal to Bach on this point:
Although Grice presented [his maxims] in the form of guidelines for how to
communicate successfully, I think they are better construed as presumptions
about utterances, presumptions that we as listeners rely on and as speakers
exploit. As listeners, we presume that the speaker is being cooperative (at least
insofar as he is trying to make his communicative intention evident) and is
speaking truthfully, informatively, relevantly, and otherwise appropriately. If
an utterance superficially appears not to conform to any of these presumptions,
the listener looks for a way of taking it so that it does conform. He does so
partly on the supposition that he is intended to. As speakers, in trying to
choose words to make our communicative intentions evident, we exploit the
fact that our listeners presume these things [Bach, 2006].
As far as we can tell, Bach’s characterization enjoys a broad consensus among (neo-Gricean)
implicature theorists. We will argue that elicitures do not fit this characterization: the
inferences in question are not triggered by any respect in which “an utterance superficially
appears not to conform to any of these presumptions.”
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beard, glasses, and that he generally arrives late to work. In such a context, (8a)
will generally be taken to convey the information that the employee’s lateness was
a cause of John’s firing her, even though it is not more prolix than alternatives
containing competing referring expressions, such as (8b), that do not evoke the
inference. Further, example (8c) is more prolix than (8a), yet does not yield the
inference that the employee’s red hair, beard, and glasses were causes of John’s
firing her.8
(8) a. John fired the employee who was always late.
b. John fired the employee who has red hair.
c. John fired the employee who has red hair, a beard, and glasses.
What the injunction against prolixity does predict is that (8c) may well be odd in our
hypothesized situation if the referent is the only employee with red hair and the
interlocutors are aware of this—i.e., in a situation in which the less prolix relative
clause in (8b) would have sufficed. But as these examples show, this phenomenon
is orthogonal to the question of under what conditions a cause will be inferred
from the relative clause.9
The implicature theorist might answer that the extrasemantic inference at work
in (8a) is a result of a violation of a Gricean norm of Relation/relevance rather than
the norm of Manner/brevity. We see several reasons why such an analysis fails.
One worry (aside from the question of what relevance means; Grice’s admo-
nition to ‘be relevant’ is of notoriously little help) is that examples such as (8b-c)
demonstrate that the function of allowing the addressee to identify the correct
referent is sufficient to establish the relevance of a restrictive relative clause. That is,
whereas (8b) may be odd in a context in which there is only one employee, it is fine
if there is more than one (assuming that only one has red hair, of course). But the
restrictive relative clause in example (8a) necessarily serves this identificational role
as well —from a set of employees, it will pick out the one who is always late— and
thus by virtue of that function it satisfies the same constraints on relevance that are
operative in (8b-c). But with relevance thereby established by this identificational
function, we are left without an explanation for why any additional inferences
8Indeed, a speaker might choose to utter (8c) in a situation in which (8a) would have
succeeded in making the referent identifiable by the hearer, if she wanted to avoid the
inference that the lateness caused the firing.
9A further reason for resisting treating elicitures as Manner/prolixity implicatures is
that they fail to exhibit a hallmark feature of the latter—the characteristic narrowing of the
denotational space of a constituent based on the existence of a less-prolix competing form
that Horn [1984] dubs a division-of-labor effect. For instance, whereas it is the competition
between the more prolix “John caused Bill to die” and the less prolix “John killed Bill” that
results in the former’s implicating indirect causation; there is no division-of-labor involved
in elicitures at all: the difference between the referring expressions in (1a-c), for instance,
only concerns the linguistic form used to refer to a particular referent.
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of the sort drawn for (8a) would be necessary to satisfy the Relation/relevance
maxim.10
What these considerations bring out is that eliciture lacks a central feature
of implicature: the former, unlike the latter, need not arise from any threatened
violation of rational or communicative norms (whether they be from Grice’s
inventory or otherwise). We take this point to reveal a crucial difference between
eliciture and implicature, and therefore to provide a compelling argument against
assimilating the former to the latter.
Moreover, the case becomes even stronger if one thinks of Grice’s explication
of implicature as providing a schematic outline of the psychological processes
leading to extrasemantic expansion.11 For one thing, any account that treats the
enrichments of interest as triggered by a threat of communicative failure faces the
difficulty that it’s unclear what could serve as a trigger: it seems that no individual
constituent is sufficient to bring about an eliciture on its own. Consideration of
examples (1a–c) might initially suggest otherwise: at first blush, one might see
these cases as showing that the relative clause (here, in the object NP) gives rise
to the extrasemantic inferences when they obtain. However, examples (11a–d)
—encountered, say, at the beginning of a newspaper story— make this position
untenable.
10An anonymous reviewer asks whether the identificational function of restrictive RCs
isn’t as much a matter of inference as elicitures are, whereby identification and eliciture are
just two different ways that a hearer could justify the speaker’s inclusion of an RC. If this
were the case, then the argument expressed above would have no force. However, we do
not share this judgment, as we find restrictive RCs to be infelicitous in cases in which they
are not required for referent identification, even if they carry an eliciture. Consider (9):
(9) The current CEO of IBM who embezzled money was just fired.
Setting aside situations in which IBM has more than one current CEO, we find example (9)
to be felicitous only if the RC is interpreted as non-restrictive, as (10) necessarily is:
(10) The current CEO of IBM, who embezzled money, was just fired.
Examples like (10), of course, demonstrate that elicitures can involve contents evoked from
non-restrictive RCs as well, and indeed in such cases it is up to the hearer to determine
why the speaker chose to include an optional attributive RC. We focus on restrictive RCs
precisely because their role in narrowing the domain of reference is obligatory, and hence
any eliciture drawn is necessarily in addition to that function.
11We put this claim conditionally because it is controversial whether to take Grice’s
own understanding of implicature as psychologically committed in this way. Thus, while
Levinson [2000, e.g., ch. 1] appears to accept a psychological construal of implicature, Saul
[2002] reads Grice as offering a mere rational reconstruction of the inference processes
that underlie a class of communicated contents, i.e., an account with no aspirations to
psychological reality. (This treatment of Grice is central to her defense of his views from
Relevance Theorists’ objections that the view is psychologically implausible.) Whatever
one’s views on this issue, however, we emphasize that the argument already provided
(about the independence of eliciture from threatened communicative failure) stands, and
provides a sufficient reason for not assimilating eliciture to implicature on its own.
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(11) a. A drunk pilot was arrested yesterday.
b. A 53 year-old pilot was arrested yesterday.
c. A drunk rapper was arrested yesterday.
d. A drunk pilot was playing golf yesterday.
Sentence (11a) will typically give rise to a rich mental picture of a pilot who was
arrested because he was flying (or perhaps preparing to fly) while inebriated. This
picture arises despite the fact that (11a) could be used to truthfully describe a
situation in which a pilot, who happened to be drinking a fair bit on his day off,
got arrested at home for cheating on his taxes. The variants in (11b–d), on the other
hand, invite no analogous inferences, despite the fact that (11b) contains the same
head noun and verb phrase as (11a), (11c) contains the same adjective and verb
phrase as (11a), and (11d) contains the same head noun and adjective as (11a). The
reason for this is intuitively clear: the basis for drawing the eliciture depends on
a causal rule that requires all three constituent meanings provided by (11a) to be
instantiated, that is, that a pilot—crucially, when flying or preparing to do so—can
be arrested for being inebriated. The speaker who utters example (11a) therefore
takes advantage of this knowledge being in the common ground to convey her
message in a particularly efficient way.
Finally, if these examples show that eliciture cannot be seen as arising from
an externally-triggered search for relevance, reflection suggests that such a picture
implausibly reverses the order of explanation in any case: it is the operation of the
hearer’s cognitive capacities for drawing connections between contents that leads
to a recognition of a relation of relevance (and to the enrichment itself), and not
the reverse. For instance, when we interpret (1a), it is not that our understanding
of the semantic contents of the matrix verb and the relative clause first provides a
signal (Relation holds!) to the effect that those contents stand in a relevance relation,
and which a search is required to identify (hmm, firing and embezzling money; those
two things are somehow related to one another, now I need to go figure out how). Nor is
it the case that interpreting (11a) results from the explicit consideration of ways
in which the meanings of all three constituents might be related (presumably to
occur only after performing three distinct pairwise searches that attempt to relate
each of the three combinations of two constituents, which as (11b-d) illustrate, will
turn up empty). Instead, it is our cognitive apparatus, in the face of learning of the
firing and the embezzlement in (1a), and the drunkenness, piloting, and arrest as
an ensemble in (11a), evokes the potential causal relationship automatically. Hence,
an appeal to the Relation maxim here is superfluous: the only possible trigger for
the inference is the very machinery that we have for establishing relevance itself,
as it can only be this very machinery that presents us with the candidate inference
in the first place. We will return to this issue in §3.2. For our present purpose of
resisting the assimilation of eliciture to Gricean implicature, what is important is
that an appeal to relevance in such cases puts the cart before the horse: It is not
a violation of the Maxim of Relation that starts the inference process; instead the
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inference process is already running, picking up the additional relevance relation
when suggested by the content of the utterances.
All told, then, we conclude that eliciture lacks hallmarks central to the notion
of implicature. Eliciture is a distinct species of extrasemantic expansion, and one
whose understanding is poorly served by assimilating it to implicature.
2.2 Impliciture
Even if it is true, as we have contended, that elicitures cannot be seen to result
from Gricean norm violations, one might still hope to account for them in terms
of other familiar tools that have been proposed to account for various forms
of extrasemantic inference (sometimes as supplements to, and sometimes as
replacements for, Gricean tools). For example, Bach [1994] urges that expansions
like those indicated in (12) should not be understood as implicatures, because they
involve the inference of content “built out of what is said”, rather than “additional
propositions external to what is said” as in implicature (p. 141). From this he
concludes that there is a level of extrasemantic expansion (“impliciture”) that sits
between what is said and what is implicated.
(12) a. Donald is too crazy. [to be a serious contender for President]
b. I haven’t had breakfast. [today]
Bach distinguishes two types of implicitures. The first type, completions, involve
“the filling in of a propositional radical”, which occurs “because the utterance is
semantically underdeterminate and completion is required” [Bach, 1994, p. 126],
as in (12a). The second type, expansions, involve “the fleshing out of the minimal
proposition expressible by an utterance” (p. 126), which occurs as a result of a
hearer recognizing “that a speaker cannot be plausibly taken, and therefore does
not intend to be taken, to mean what he is saying” (p. 136), as in (12b).
Eliciture differs from impliciture in two important respects. First, like impli-
cature, impliciture is driven by a characteristic kind of breakdown. Specifically,
impliciture arises when the output that semantics generates without those forms
of expansion is insufficient to fix (in the case of completions) or to fix appropriately
(in the case of expansions) truth-conditional content. Elicitures, on the other hand,
do not require the types of triggers necessary for these types of expansion: they
do not appear to depend on any kind of incompleteness or infelicity, and are not
the result of a grammatical shortcoming, a norm violation, lack of relevance to the
speaker’s goals, nor any question on the part of the hearer about the plausibility
of the unenriched meaning of the utterance. Indeed, sentences that give rise to
elicitures are perfectly felicitous even if the inferences under consideration are not
drawn.
The second dissimilarity is that implicitures are restricted to inferences that
constitute developments of the logical form of an utterance. Elicitures, in contrast,
are not properly characterized as developments of a single logical form; they
instead, like implicatures, represent inferences to additional propositions that are
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external to the logical form of the utterance itself: in (1a) the proposition denoted
by the embezzlement was the reason for the firing is inferred alongside the company fired
the manager who was embezzling money, in (2b) the proposition denoted by the drug-
induced confusion caused the fall is inferred alongside the drug-addled undergrad fell off
of the Torrey Pines cliffs, and in (3a) the proposition denoted by the victim was jogging
at the time of the accident is inferred alongside a jogger was hit by a car in Fresno last
night. It would appear, then, that elicitures fail to meet the defining characteristics
of impliciture.
2.3 Local pragmatic strengthening
There is yet another class of extrasemantic enrichments —henceforth, LOCAL
PRAGMATIC STRENGTHENINGS— that is potentially relevant to our examples.
The hallmark of this class is that its members involve a strengthening (or,
more generally, modification) in meaning of a particular constituent or implicit
relationship between constituents. Once again, one can ask whether the inferences
we are highlighting can be understood by subsuming them under this heading. We
argue that they cannot.
An early articulation of the local pragmatic strengthening idea is offered by
Geis and Zwicky [1971], who introduce cases of “invited inference” such as the
conditional perfection inference in (13a) and the strengthening of the conjunction
and in (14a):
(13) a. I’ll give you five dollars if you mow the lawn.
b. I’ll give you five dollars if and only if you mow the lawn.
(14) a. Martha observed the children at play and smiled with pleasure.
b. Martha observed the children at play and as a result smiled with
pleasure.
They observe that the typical interpretation of the conditional in (13a) is as a
biconditional, i.e. a strengthening from if to if and only if per (13b). Similarly,
the typical interpretation of the conjunction in (14a) involves strengthening to a
causal relation, per (14b).
Later neo-Griceans have sometimes held [contrary to Geis and Zwicky, 1971,
p. 565] that such cases should be thought of as instances of Gricean implicature.
Thus, Horn [2004] proposes to treat Geis’s and Zwicky’s cases as instances of what
he calls R-implicatures, assimilating them to the domain of the second part of
the quantity maxim (“say no more than you must”). The reasoning goes that
these expressions have come to have stereotypical meanings, so to spell out if
as if and only if or and as and as a result is to provide more information than is
necessary. Similarly, Levinson [2000], who advocates a three-way division among
Q-, M-, and I-Principles, classifies these cases as resulting from I-inferences. His
I-Principle comes in two parts, a Speaker’s maxim of minimization (“Say as little as
necessary; that is, produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve
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your communicational ends (bearing Q in mind)”), and a Recipient’s corollary
termed the Enrichment Rule (“Amplify the information content of the speaker’s
utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be
the speaker’s m-intended point”). In this category he collects conditional strength-
ening (13), “conjunction buttressing” (14), inference to stereotypes (secretary ⇒
female secretary), and negative strengthening (I don’t like Alice⇒ I positively dislike
Alice).12 13
Recanati [1993, 2004, 2010] offers a rather different view —one he explicitly
labels ‘non-Gricean’— that analyzes these varieties of local enrichment by a hand-
ful of optional/non-mandated processes of pragmatic enrichment that partially
overlap with those falling under Levinson’s Enrichment Rule. Recanati’s processes
include “free enrichment”/“specifization” (“making the interpretation of some
expression in the sentence contextually more specific” [Recanati, 2004, 24]; e.g.,
the bridging inference in (15a)), “loosening” (“a condition of application packed
into the concept literally expressed by a predicate is contextually dropped so that
the application of the predicate is widened” (p. 26); e.g., in (15b)), and “semantic
transfer” (“the output is neither an enriched nor an impoverished version of the
concept literally expressed by the input expression . . . [but] a different concept
altogether, bearing a systematic relation to it” (p. 26); e.g., in (15c)).
(15) a. Free enrichment: Mary took out her key and opened the door. ⇒ Mary
opened the door with the key she had taken out.
12 Levinson also includes a number of other phenomena in this category, making for quite
a heterogeneous lot. Some examples:
(a) Bridging: John unpacked the picnic. The beer was warm. ⇒ The beer was part of the
picnic.
(b) Preferred local coreference: John came in and he sat down. ⇒ John came in and John sat
down.
(c) Noun-noun compounds: The oil compressor gauge ⇒ The gauge that measures the
state of the compressor that compresses the oil.
(d) Possessive interpretation: Wendy’s children ⇒ Those children to whom she is a parent.
These are clearly different from the phenomena discussed above in that they are
linguistically mandated forms of strengthening. For instance, the definite the beer in (a)
is not otherwise felicitous if the addressee cannot uniquely identify the referent. Likewise,
one has not understood he in (b) if its referent is not recovered, oil compressor gauge in (c)
without recovering some semantic relationship between the nominals, or Wendy’s children
in (d) without recovering the relationship between the possessive and the head noun.
13At one point Levinson seems to acknowledge the need for further inferential machinery
beyond that supplied by Gricean mechanisms themselves: in his full spelling out of his
I-Principle (p. 114), Levinson gives four specific subcorollaries of his Recipient’s corollary,
including the instruction to “Assume the richest temporal, casual and referential connection
between described situation or events, consistent with what is taken for granted”. Though
we are unsure what Levinson has in mind here (he doesn’t cite examples like ours, and offers
no proposal about the source of such inferences), it may be that he would regard elicitures
as falling under this heading.
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b. Loosening: The ATM swallowed my credit card.⇒ The (inanimate) ATM
took my credit card and didn’t give it back.
c. Transfer: I am parked out back. ⇒ The car I own/drive is parked out
back.
One way in which Recanati differs from the other theorists mentioned in this
section is in holding that the processes responsible for the enrichments in cases
like (13)–(14) also apply during the process of semantic composition (Recanati
[2004, 34–36]; Recanati [2010, ch. 1]), as in (16a–b):
(16) a. He eats/wears rabbit. ⇒ the meat/fur from a rabbit.
b. The driver/policeman stopped the car⇒ by applying the brake/by direct-
ing the driver to apply the brake. [adapted from Rumelhart, 1979, 78]
The enrichments in these cases still have the property of being local, however, in the
sense that they arise from the combination of the meanings of sibling constituents
in the syntax.
In contrast, our examples differ from the cases addressed by both Geis &
Zwicky and Recanati in their unrestrictedly non-local character. For one thing,
as we have seen, eliciture-based inferences include many for which it is difficult
to locate any lexical/constructional trigger smaller than the whole utterance
(e.g., 3a, 11a). Hence, such cases lack the specific lexical or constructional triggers
characteristic of Geis’s and Zwicky’s examples: e.g., the result reading for ‘and’,
the biconditional for ‘if. . . then’, etc.14 Second, unlike Recanati’s examples, the
meanings whose association give rise to the enriched interpretation are often
not those of sibling constituents in syntax, and hence cannot be triggered via
semantic composition [cf. Recanati’s rejection of free enrichment at the “topmost
level” Recanati, 2010, p. 23]. Third, the inferred extrasemantic content generated
by eliciture is propositional, rather than an alternative interpretation of any
subpropositional constituent as in the examples addressed here. And finally, as we
mentioned in §2.2, the propositional output of eliciture is not a replacement of the
unenriched meaning of the utterance, but a supplement that sits alongside the latter
(e.g., The company fired the manager who was embezzling money⇒ the embezzlement
was the reason for the firing). Consequently, eliciture cannot be analyzed simply as
a strengthening of a constituent meaning to a stereotypical interpretation (or other
local modification and replacement).
2.4 Relevance Theory
We take the foregoing discussion to have shown that the phenomenon of eliciture
is conceptually distinct from standard forms of extrasemantic content that have
become familiar within the Gricean tradition and its nearby offshoots. We now
want to consider eliciture from the perspective of Relevance Theory (henceforth
14Reasons for doubting the applicability of Horn’s and Levinson’s treatment of examples
(13)–(14) to cases of eliciture, i.e., by appeal to implicature, were discussed in §2.1.
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RT) —perhaps the leading alternative to the Gricean framework for understanding
extrasemantic expansion— which aims to treat a surprisingly wide variety of
interpretive phenomena (including all pragmatic enrichment) in a uniform way
[Sperber and Wilson, 1986, Wilson and Sperber, 2004, inter alia]. Here we’ll briefly
outline RT before considering its application to eliciture, and then argue that
(despite important similarities between the view and our own positive account,
presented in §3) eliciture ultimately resists explanation in Relevance Theoretic
terms.
Broadly speaking, RT treats linguistic interpretation as a matter of inferring
speaker meaning from the evidence of heard utterances and other assumptions
operative in the context. The key technical notion in the theory is that of
the RELEVANCE of an input—a ratio of its number of contextual effects (viz.,
conclusions derivable from that input and background assumptions together but
not from either alone) to the processing costs of obtaining it in that context [Sperber
and Wilson, 1986, p. 125]. On the RT picture, heard utterances guide a hearer’s
recovery of speaker meaning because they raise expectations of their own relevance,
as per what Sperber and Wilson call the COMMUNICATIVE PRINCIPLE OF REL-
EVANCE: “Every utterance (or other act of overt communication) communicates
the presumption of its own optimal relevance” [Sperber and Wilson, 1986, p. 260].
Given that, for them, speakers guide their communicative activity in accord with
the principle of relevance, hearers should interpret utterances by disambiguating,
resolving, and expanding them in the most relevant way—i.e., by pairing them
with specific meanings that facilitate the most inferences with the least effort. Thus,
on this view,
The hearer should take the linguistically encoded sentence meaning;
following a path of least effort, he should enrich it at the explicit
level and complement it at the implicit level until the resulting
interpretation meets his expectations of relevance [Wilson and Sperber,
2004, p. 258].
This conception of interpretation is ultimately enshrined in the theory’s single
interpretative procedure, the RELEVANCE-THEORETIC COMPREHENSION PRO-
CEDURE [Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 259]:
(17) a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpre-
tive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures,
etc.) in order of accessibility.
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned).
Applied to an instance of eliciture like (1a), the proposal would presumably be that
interpreting the utterance as communicating the information that the embezzling
caused the firing represents a gain in relevance over an interpretation that omits
this information, in so far as the former interpretation adds important contextual
effects at relatively low processing costs.
Within its broad approach to linguistic interpretation, RT makes room for
two specific forms of pragmatic expansion: EXPLICATURE, a type of expansion
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aimed at the development of the logical form of the utterance (“An assumption
communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a development of
a logical form encoded by U”), and IMPLICATURE, defined as any enrichment
that is not explicature (“Any assumption communicated, but not explicitly so, is
implicitly communicated: it is an implicature”) [Sperber and Wilson, 1986, p. 182].15
The fact that explicatures constitute developments of logical forms entails what has
become a canonical diagnostic used to distinguish explicature from implicature—
the capacity for explicature to affect, or “intrude on,” truth value. For instance,
RTists argue that explicatures lead to inclusion of the bracketed material in such
examples as (12a–b, repeated as 18a–b), and that this happens prior to semantic
evaluation, as a step on the way to fixing the truth-conditional contents expressed
by utterances.
(18) a. Donald is too crazy. [to be a serious contender for President]
b. I haven’t had breakfast. [today]
Thus, Carston [2002] suggests that the pragmatic strengthening resulting in the
conveyance of the bracketed material in (19a–b) must be treated as explicature
rather than implicature (i.e., as making a contribution prior to semantic evaluation),
on pain of our being unable to account for the possible truth of (19c) (cf. Cohen
[1971, p. 58]; Wilson [1975, p. 151]).16
(19) a. Annie got married and had a baby. [in that order]
b. Annie had a baby and got married. [in that order]
c. If Annie got married and had a baby, her parents would be happy, but
if she had a baby and got married, they’d be very unhappy.
This behavior is inconsistent with implicatures in RT, which by definition are
propositions that are inferred in addition to, and hence do not affect the truth
value of, the proposition denoted by the linguistically coded material and its
explicatures.17
15The term ‘explicature’ is used variably in the literature to refer either to the entirety of
what is explicitly communicated by an utterance, or only the components of this meaning
that result from a development of the logical form that the utterance encodes; we follow the
latter usage here.
16Here we follow Carston (and the consensus) in treating the conveyed/bracketed
material in (19a–b) (mutatis mutandis, the conveyed information at issue in our example
(1a)) as being supplied extrasemantically rather than semantically (and so as potential
instances of pragmatic intrusion into semantics). Of course, as King and Stanley [2005]
point out, that treatment presupposes that there is no adequate semantic explanation of the
origin of the relevant information; and they are surely correct that, at least in principle, this
presupposition is open to question. We believe the standard treatment is defensible in these
cases, e.g. because the information appears to pass standard tests for extrasemantic status
such as being cancelable and reinforceable.
17It should be stressed that whereas both Grice’s account and RT distinguish implicatures
from the propositions that are semantically encoded by utterances, RT’s division between
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It is worth noting that, partly because it has the aim of accounting for
linguistic understanding quite generally speaking, RT’s approach to the topic of
extrasemantic expansion differs in important respects from the approaches we
have considered so far—respects to which we are largely sympathetic (and that
are shared significantly by our own approach to eliciture; cf. §3). For one thing,
and unlike the views discussed in §§2.1–2.3, RT does not treat enrichments as
special phenomena whose interpretation is triggered by communicative failure.
On the contrary, for RT, any utterance is incomplete and hence in need of
enrichment if it is to satisfy the presumption of relevance [cf. the comprehension
procedure for interpreting heard utterances outlined by Wilson and Sperber, 2004,
p. 261ff]. The view therefore construes enrichments as natural by-products
of normal interpretative processes. For another, proponents of RT view those
normal interpretive processes as instances of general cognitive capacities that
happen to be directed on linguistic inputs, rather than applications of language-
specific procedures. (This commitment falls out of their Cognitive Principle
of Relevance: “Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of
relevance”; p. 254.) Moreover, they hold that utterance-construction is guided
by the aim of of deliberately exploiting comprehenders’ not-specifically-linguistic
inferential/interpretive capacities, so that the latter not only direct interpretation
but feed utterance planning as well (“I may be able to produce a stimulus which
is likely to attract your attention, to prompt the retrieval of certain contextual
assumptions and to point you towards an intended conclusion”; p. 254).
Despite the areas of agreement between our account and RT, we believe that
elicitures are problematic for RT in at least two significant respects. The first is
that elicitures are not classifiable into either of the two types of enrichment that the
theory posits. On the one hand, elicitures appear to exhibit the kind of pragmatic
intrusion that, as we saw, is compatible only with explicature. To see this, consider
(20), spoken by a union leader at the union’s monthly membership meeting:
(20) If the company fires an employee who comes in late, a union complaint
will be lodged.
It seems that this sentence could be judged true even under a scenario in which an
employee came in late one day, was promptly fired for having embezzled money,
and yet the union did nothing. That is, the fact that he wasn’t fired because he was
late causes the event to not satisfy the antecedent of the conditional in (20). As we
have seen, the fact that eliciture exhibits this sort of intrusion on truth-conditional
meaning is incompatible with treating it as a form of implicature within RT.18
explicature and implicature fails to line up with Grice’s distinction between what is said
and what is implicated. Specifically, a variety of enrichments that Grice would characterize
as implicatures are argued to be explicatures in RT (e.g., (19)).
18Note that this point applies to both STRONG implicature and WEAK implicature in RT.
Wilson and Sperber [2004] say:
A proposition . . . is STRONGLY IMPLICATED . . . if its recovery is essential in
order to arrive at an interpretation that satisfies the expectations of relevance
18
On the other hand, eliciture lacks a defining characteristic of explicature as
well. As we have discussed, the core of RT’s distinction between explicature and
implicature lies in the fact that the former but not the latter are developments
(completions/expansions) of the logical form of an utterance. However, as we
observed in §2.2, this is not true of eliciture, which often results in inferences to
additional propositions entirely external to the logical form of the utterance itself.
It would appear, then, that elicitures fit neatly into neither of the two categories of
pragmatic expansion allowed by RT.
A second and more general problem that elicitures present for RT has to do
with the nature of the comprehension procedure posited by the view (17). One of
our central arguments against invoking Grice’s notion of relevance as a source of
explanation for our cases (see §2.1) applies equally here, specifically with respect
to examples like (8a–c): given that relative clauses are deemed relevant if they do
nothing more than restrict the domain of reference for the NP they modify (8b), we
see no explanation for why inference would go any further in cases like (8a), in light
of the hearer’s instruction to stop upon the meeting of relevance expectations per
(17b). After all, the vast majority of restrictive relative clauses found in discourse
serve only this basic identificational function; those that convey an eliciture (which,
crucially, do so in addition to, and not instead of, serving the basic function) are
atypical. It is therefore hard to see how an interpreter’s expectations of relevance
would not be met by establishing that an RC felicitously serves the basic function
alone.19
raised by the utterance itself. It is WEAKLY IMPLICATED if its recovery helps
with the construction of an interpretation that is relevant in the expected way,
but is not itself essential because the utterance suggests a range of similar
possible implicatures, any one of which would do [Wilson and Sperber, 2004,
p. 269].
Examples of weak implicatures include metaphors —e.g., John has a square mind— which
convey meaning beyond their (generally false) literal meanings, but which are otherwise less
determinate than typical (strong) implicatures. Whereas elicitures are more similar in their
behavior to strong implicatures —the candidate enrichments are clear and determinate—
neither type can allow for the sort of intrusion into truth conditional content witnessed in
(20).
19We will argue in §3.2 that the inferential processes that endow hearers with the ability
to draw elicitures in cases like (1a) are precisely those that hearers utilize to establish the
coherence of intersentential discourses such as (21).
(21) The company fired the manager. He was embezzling money.
But there is an important difference between the inter- and intra-sentential cases that
amounts to a further difficulty for RT: in the intersentential case, the hearer must draw some
sort of relevancy relation (‘coherence relation’) between the clauses, or else the sentences will
not constitute a coherent discourse. We believe that RT’s characterization of the interpreter’s
need for linguistic material to meet his expectation of relevance aptly characterizes the
interpretation of intersentential cases (as witnessed by the fact that interpreters will, within
limits and according to certain principles, infer additional content needed to meet that
expectation). However, as we will see, this is precisely the quality that elicitures lack (see
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One might respond to this objection by proposing that perhaps elicitures result
from an automatic/low-cost inferential process that, per the maximization of
relevance, is outweighed by the added cognitive effect associated with it. After all,
as Sperber notes,
The claim that the human cognitive system tends to allocate resources
to the processing of available inputs according to their expected
relevance is at the basis of relevance theory [Sperber, 2005, pp. 67–
68].
However, as Levinson [1987, 1989] and others have pointed out, the problem
with this claim is that the processor can have no way of knowing what the added
cognitive effects (if any) would be of a particular enrichment without doing the
work to calculate the candidate enrichment beforehand:
This would clearly involve comparison of different interpretations; but
obviously to compare interpretations would involve computing each
of them, thus additively increasing C[osts], so R[elevance] predicts it
will be cheaper to pick any one interpretation at random! (Sperber and
Wilson are aware of this difficulty, and suggest heuristics must exist
that allow estimation of costs without computation (131); and so they
must, and must be described and shown to work, if the theory of R is
to survive) [Levinson, 1989].
As Levinson [1987] notes, however, RT offers no detailed hypotheses regarding
such heuristics; but without such concrete hypotheses, the view’s explanations for
enrichments will remain objectionably post hoc.
Even setting this point aside, it seems doubtful that such heuristics, regardless
of the form they take, would naturally cover the cases of eliciture addressed here.
As we have noted, only a small minority of RCs found in natural language usage
appear to support the sort of causal eliciture we see in (1a); certainly cases like
(1b) are by far the typical case. Given this, it is hard to see how a heuristic
would recommend expending the effort to attempt the inference of an eliciture,
when very few instances will pay back the effort expended. We therefore take the
theory to predict, on the basis of the relevance-theoretic comprehension principle,
that interpretation will stop without attempting to seek enrichments of the sort
witnessed in (1a).20
the discussion of examples (27) and (28) in §3.2). It is unclear to us how this important
distinction between the intersentential and intrasentential cases could be captured in RT, as
one would expect the principles of the theory to apply with equal force in the two scenarios.
20Another source of doubt arises from Sperber and Wilson’s characterization of a positive
cognitive effect:
When is an input relevant? Intuitively, an input (a sight, a sound, an utterance,
a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with background
information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him: say,
by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a
certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken
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We take the arguments of this section to establish that an adequate explanation
of eliciture within RT is just as unlikely as an account framed in terms of the
categories of the broad Gricean/neo-Gricean tradition we considered in §§2.1–
2.3. Having made these arguments in some detail above, we are tempted by the
following (necessarily more programmatic) diagnosis: RT struggles with eliciture
because it attempts to explain this and all other forms of extrasemantic expansion
in natural language, and the full array of inferences that result, as arising from a
single explanatory source (viz., the mandate to maximize relevance). As we have
taken pains in this paper to stress, the properties of the various enrichments we
have surveyed differ along various dimensions, and are heterogeneous in their
character. The history of linguistic research has taught us that language is highly
complex at all levels of interpretation, and there is little reason to expect that the
landscape of pragmatics would be significantly simpler. (We’ll return to this theme
in §4.) In our view, therefore, the argumentative burden rests firmly with those
who would posit a uniform principle governing the establishment of such a wide
range of inferences to extrasemantic content. In what follows, we offer our account
of the cognitive apparatus that underlies the conveyance of eliciture. We intend
for eliciture to take its place alongside the other types of extrasemantic expansion
discussed in §2.1–2.3, and not as providing a new overarching principle intended
to cover the breadth of phenomena addressed by RT.
3 Eliciture and inference
We have argued that eliciture resists reduction to other mechanisms of extrase-
mantic expansion. In this section, we’d like to suggest an alternative picture of
eliciture and the kinds of extrasemantic expansion involved. We’ll claim that this
picture is in some respects more minimal than standard accounts of other types of
extrasemantic enrichment, and connect it with an understanding of the cognitive
strategies underpinning discourse processing.
impression. In relevance-theoretic terms, an input is relevant to an individual
when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a POSITIVE
COGNITIVE EFFECT [Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 251].
As far as we can tell, it is not true that a hearer’s propensity to draw an eliciture depends
on his own goals and needs. On the contrary, a hearer who is utterly unconcerned with
the reason for the manager’s firing is as likely to draw the inference as a much more
invested hearer. Indeed, as we noted in fn. 2, even experimental participants —who are
completely detached from the situations conveyed by the experimental stimuli— are prone
to draw elicitures. This is expected on our hypothesis that relevance-establishing machinery
naturally serves up the inference regardless of the goals and needs of a particular hearer
(see §3).
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3.1 Linguistic enrichment and cognitive enrichment
On our picture, elicitures result from a speaker constructing her utterances so as to
exploit a particular set of her hearer’s general cognitive (not specifically linguistic)
strategies for making sense of the world.
It is a familiar thought —and one that is very plausibly independent of any
details of our linguistic capacities in particular— that cognitive agents make
ampliative inferences that take them to conclusions beyond what is immediately
justified by perception or other forms of direct evidence. Among other things, they
also draw inferences that their observations invite, and incorporate the conclusions
of these inferences into their evolving world models [cf., inter alia, Rauschenberger
and Yantis, 2001, Hubbard, 1995, Strickland and Keil, 2011].
To see this point, consider an utterly unremarkable situation in which someone
sees a chronically tardy department store employee show up late for work again,
and soon thereafter witnesses the employee being fired. A reasonable cognitive
agent might infer that the firing was due to the lateness, even if she had no first-
hand evidence. Now consider a situation in which our department store employee
shows up late for work again, and our agent subsequently sees a customer asking
the employee where the automotive department is. In this case, our cognitive
agent is unlikely to infer any relationship between the customer’s question and
the employee’s lateness. Why? Because our world knowledge does not support
a causal connection between the events. The lesson appears to be that when an
inference of this sort suggests itself as in the firing scenario, a thinker will likely
draw it, at least provisionally. However, the world remains perfectly coherent
when no such inference between eventualities presents itself, as in the customer
question scenario.
Our suggestion is that the very same strategies for making sense of the
non-linguistically presented world should show up in the course of interpreting
discourses that describe such situations linguistically. That is, when a hearer
interprets (22),
(22) The boss fired the employee who came in late again.
he will reasonably associate the firing with the lateness in the same way in which
they are associated in the (non-linguistic) case considered above, in which the
events were perceived. Likewise, our addressee will presumably not draw a causal
inference for the variant in (23):
(23) A customer asked the employee who came in late again where the
automotive department is.
Here, all that is necessary for the object NP to be felicitous is that it allows the
addressee to identify the referent.
In some respects, then, the inferences underpinning elicitures are of the most
pedestrian sort. They are simply the inferences cognizers make in order to organize
and bring coherence to their evolving world models.
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That said, and notwithstanding our arguments in §2, we do not wish to claim
that elicitures have nothing in common with Gricean implicatures or inferences
grounded in other types of pragmatic reasoning. Quite the contrary. The common
property that these inferences share is that they result from the hearer asking not
only what the speaker said, but also why. In the case of certain Gricean implicatures,
the inference results from asking why the speaker made a particular statement
instead of something else that might have been possible. For instance, the possible
implicatures associated with Some students got an A —that either it is not the case
that all students got an A (quantity implicature), or that the speaker does not know
whether all students got an A (ignorance implicature)— can be seen to result from
the consideration of possible reasons why the speaker chose to say some instead of
all. In the case of indirect speech acts, interpretation depends on understanding
why a particular utterance was made in light of the speaker’s communicative goals.
That is, the addressee who recognizes the statement It’s cold in here as an indirect
request to close the window has done so by asking why the utterance was made by
the speaker in light of (his estimation of) her beliefs, desires, and intentions, and
not just what the utterance denotes.
Theorists have held that the inference procedures that give rise to such
enrichments require an appeal to MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE: a speaker can only
be said to be communicating extrasemantic content if the knowledge required
to support the inference to that content is intended by the speaker to be taken into
account by the addressee, if the addressee likewise recognizes that the speaker
intends for it to be taken into account, and so on. Likewise, when interpreting
(3a), it stands to reason that a hearer would ask why the speaker is describing the
referent as a jogger, as opposed to other possible descriptions (a man, a Stanford
student, etc.). A likely justification is that the speaker wishes to communicate
that the victim was jogging at the time, which is a proposition that the hearer
can readily accommodate as long as it is consistent with his beliefs about the
world. Again, as with other types of pragmatic enrichment, mutual knowledge
about plausible relationships (here, between jogging and accidents) is necessary
for this reasoning to go through. But whereas the speaker, in choosing this form
of reference, is counting on the hearer to ask why that particular form was chosen,
she is not relying on the kinds of inference procedures that underlie Gricean
implicatures or the plan-based reasoning about intentions upon which indirect
speech act recognition is based. Instead, she relies on the fact that the addressee,
upon hearing (3a), will draw a connection between the jogging and the accident
because world knowledge suggests that they can be so related, and takes advantage
of this fact to communicate her message in a particularly economical way.21
21The claim that intention recognition is crucial for the inference to elicitures predicts that,
in certain contexts, a hearer might fail to draw an eliciture that would otherwise ordinarily
be drawn. For instance, if in a particular situation the referring expression the employee who
is always late is the only form that can achieve successful reference and this fact is clear to
the conversational participants, the existence of an alternate explanation for the speaker’s
choice of RC may likely weaken the hearer’s inclination to draw the eliciture. Another case,
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3.2 Inference and coherence relations
The idea that eliciture is grounded in general cognitive mechanisms for under-
standing the world invites us to ask just what the relevant cognitive mechanisms
are and how they operate. We propose that the mechanisms should be understood
as a class of operations that connect individual mental states into a coherent whole
by virtue of relations between their contents.
Of course, the idea that mentation proceeds in terms of links between contents
is a familiar one in the history of thought about cognition, with roots stretching at
least to Epicurus (Diogenes Laertius vii. §52, x. §32), Plato (the doctrine of anamnesis
in the Phaedo), and Aristotle (On Memory and Recollection 2, 451b16–22), and
coming to prominence with 18th century thinkers including Hobbes (Human Nature,
iv, (4.15)), Berkeley (New Theory of Vision, §25), and Hartley (Observations on Man).
However, perhaps the most influential articulation of the idea comes from Hume,
who holds that ideas juxtaposed in thought are always connected by one of three
types of associative links: “Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or
Effect” (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §III).
Though we do not wish to commit to a Humean or associationist picture of
human psychology, we are sympathetic to the more general idea that cognition can
be understood in terms of relations between the contents of thoughts entertained
in a thinker’s temporally extended cognitive sequence. More specifically, we are
attracted to the view that discourse understanding is often fruitfully explained
in terms of hearers’ attempts to bring coherence to heard clauses by subsuming
the latter under semantic relations—henceforth, COHERENCE RELATIONS.22 For
instance, on its most natural interpretation, the sentences in example (24) are
connected by an Explanation relation [Hobbs, 1990], whereby the state described
in the second sentence is interpreted as a cause of or reason for the event expressed
in the first sentence.
(24) John is traveling to Paris. He wants to visit his family.
Establishing an Explanation relation will typically require additional inferences;
upon hearing (24), for instance, a hearer will normally infer that John’s family is
or will be in Paris, and that John intends to visit his family during his trip. Even
though the passage never asserts that John has this intention, inferring that he does
is required in order to treat the proposition expressed by the second sentence as a
reason for the proposition expressed by the first.
There is a clear parallel between these intersentential inferences and those
arising in the examples we have discussed in this paper; the inference drawn
suggested by an anonymous reviewer, is where one friend often tells another stories about
work colleagues, and the phrase the employee who is always late has, over time, become a
conventionalized way of referring to one of them. We see no way that elicitures in such
cases could be blocked without appeal to intention-based reasoning.
22For more detail on this program, see Kehler [2002], which draws on Hobbs’s [1979, 1990]
theory of discourse coherence, and taxonomizes coherence relations in terms that mirror
Hume’s catalog of associative relations.
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for (25), for instance, mirrors the one that will be drawn to establish the coherence
of (26):23
(25) John fired the employee who was always late.
(26) John fired the employee. He was always late.
As we briefly mentioned in fn. 19, the crucial difference between these interclausal
inferences and the intraclausal ones is that there is a requirement that the hearer
be able to draw some coherence relation among the clauses in (26) in order to
justify their juxtaposition in the discourse. Specifically, as argued by many theories
of discourse coherence [e.g., Hobbs, 1990, Kehler, 2002, Asher and Lascarides,
2003], coherent discourses require their clauses to be structurally related in much
the same way that grammatical sentences require their syntactic constituents to
be; discourses thus admit of hierarchical structures in the way that sentences
do. The fundamental difference is that whereas the constraints on when adjacent
constituents can combine to form larger ones in building a sentence structure are
dictated by grammatical rules, in the realm of discourse ‘grammar’ it is the ability
to infer coherence relations that determines when clauses (or collections thereof at
higher levels of structure) can be combined. As such, it is not enough for addressees
to merely interpret the two clauses in (26) as independent statements about John
[Hobbs, 1979]. In contrast, the fact there is no coherence criterion that applies
among constituents within a clause means that the same inference for (25) is merely
invited; hence, felicity is not at stake at this level.
This characterization predicts that we will find cases in which multiple
predications about an entity will be infelicitous when expressed as a discourse
yet felicitous when expressed within a sentence. To see that this prediction is borne
out, consider (27):
(27) # The employee broke his leg. He likes plums. (variant of example from
Knott and Dale [1994])
Outside of an exceptional context, (27) lacks coherence.24 In contrast, a version that
expresses the same content intraclausally is fine:
(28) The employee who likes plums broke his leg.
Whereas the inclusion of the plum-liking in a relative clause in (28) presupposes
that it will help the hearer identify the referent, no further coherence-driven
inferences are required at the sentence level, in contrast to (27).
23See Hobbs [2010] and Pagin [2014] for similar observations. These works will be
discussed briefly in fn. 28.
24The reader might object by offering a context that would make (27) coherent, e.g., one in
which the employee made an unsuccessful attempt to climb a plum tree. Indeed, it appears
that is it always possible to come up with a context that will make any pair of seemingly
unrelated sentences coherent. But as Hobbs [1979] points out, the very fact that addressees
are driven to identify such contexts shows that establishing coherence between sentences is
a necessary component of discourse interpretation.
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Another coherence relation that we already have seen is Denial, in which an
expected cause-effect relation is denied, as in (29):
(29) Snodgrass is honest, even though he’s a politician.
Importantly, Denial presupposes the very cause-effect relation that is being denied
in the particular instance being described; here the addressee would rightfully
assume that the speaker believes that politicians are normally dishonest. (The
addressee could even felicitously reject this presupposition —Hey, I think most
politicians are honest!— even though nothing in what (29) asserts contradicts that
sentiment.) And, as expected, we see the same pattern between intrasentential and
intersentential cases:
(30) a. The company fired the manager who has a long history of corporate
awards.
b. The company fired the manager (even though) he has a long history of
corporate awards.
(31) a. The company fired the manager who drives a blue Lexus.
b. # The company fired the manager (even though) he drives a blue Lexus.
Passages (30a-b) both give rise to the counter-to-expectation inference between
getting fired and having a long history of corporate awards. Passages (31a-b) again
illustrate the fact that such inferences are unnecessary at the intrasentential level:
whereas (31a) is impeccable, (31b) leaves the addressee searching for a coherence
relation (causal or otherwise) between the two clauses.
Example (3a), repeated below as (32), is among the cases we have considered
that are not causal in nature:
(32) A jogger was hit by a car in Fresno last night.
Here the jogging is not inferred to have caused the accident, but only as what the
victim was doing at the time the accident occurred. Such relationships are instances
of the Occasion coherence relation [Hobbs, 1990]. Occasion relations characterize
spatiotemporally related series of events that are connected by intermediate states
of affairs in the world. Consider:
(33) The employee went to the store. He bought a bottle of scotch for the office
party.
Although there is no causality at play here, an inference is necessary to establish
Occasion on the most natural interpretation of (33), specifically that the scotch was
bought at the store.25 We can compare (33) to its intrasentential variant in (34):
25It is of course possible to construct a context that favors a different coherence construal
for passages like (33). For instance, if (33) was given as an answer to the question What
things did the employee do today?, it is possible to interpret the two clauses as independent
events. The operative coherence relation in this case would be Parallel.
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(34) The employee who went to the store bought a bottle of scotch for the office
party.
Again, passage (34) invites the same inference as (33). However, unlike (33), (34)
remains felicitous if the inference is not drawn. As such, we again see a contrast in
acceptability between variants in which Occasion is not supported:
(35) a. The employee who went to UC San Diego for grad school bought a
bottle of scotch for the office party.
b. # The employee went to UC San Diego for grad school. He bought a
bottle of scotch for the office party.
Our proposal, then, is that eliciture is grounded in the same cognitive
mechanisms that are already needed to explain the establishment of coherence
relationships across utterances in a discourse. The main difference is that whereas
identifying some relationship is required when establishing relevance across clauses,
there is no mandate to do so between constituent meanings within a clause.
4 Taking stock: Eliciture, coherence, and pragmatic
theory
Having presented an account of eliciture in terms of intrasentential coherence in
§3, we are now in a position to take stock, ask what we can and cannot show, and
draw lessons for pragmatic theory.
4.1 Intersentential coherence and pragmatic theory
One such lesson concerns the relationship between intersentential coherence and
the familiar categories of pragmatic enrichment discussed in §2. We have argued
(§2) that eliciture is not assimilable to these familiar categories. Moreover, we have
argued (§3.2) that the inferential mechanism responsible for drawing elicitures is
the same one that underlies the process of establishing intersentential coherence.
Taking these thoughts together would seem to cast similarly strong doubt on the
possibility of understanding cases involving intersentential coherence in terms
of the familiar categories. This is notable because there is a long tradition in
pragmatics of proposals that take this form.
For example, consider Levinson’s attempt to explain as instances of implicature
the class of cases he dubs “conjunction buttressing,” as in Geis’s and Zwicky’s (14a),
repeated below as (36):
(36) Martha observed the children at play and smiled with pleasure.
As we pointed out in fn. 13, for Levinson the strengthening of the meaning of and
to and as a result (36b) is an example of an I-implicature. However, as Levinson
himself (pp. 122–127) and others note, the same enrichments we see in (36) can
occur without the conjunction:
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(37) Martha observed the children at play. She smiled with pleasure.
There cannot be “conjunction buttressing” if there is no conjunction to buttress. It
is true that and does serve a function relevant to coherence establishment, in that
it is only compatible with certain coherence relations (it disallows Explanation, for
instance— the sentence Fred slipped and he stepped on a plum cannot mean that Fred
slipped because he stepped on a plum). But to speak of drawing a causal relation
between clauses as an enrichment of a conjunction meaning gets things back to
front: conjunction meanings influence coherence establishment, not the other way
around.
Such strengthenings have been treated as examples of impliciture as well.
Specifically, Bach [2010] includes cases like (36) among those involving impliciture
—particularly as expansions— on analogy with (12a), repeated below as (38).
(38) I haven’t had breakfast. [today]
However, it is hard to see how Bach’s characterization of expansion —“the fleshing
out of the minimal proposition expressible by an utterance” as necessarily triggered
by a hearer recognizing “that a speaker cannot be plausibly taken, and therefore
does not intend to be taken, to mean what he is saying”— would apply to many
examples. Consider:
(39) Pence became really angry, and Trump threw a tantrum.
Note that there are two salient construals for (39). The first is an (unenriched)
Parallel construal: Trump and his Vice-President were each overcome with negative
emotions, possibly (but not necessarily) due to the same external stimulus. The
second is an (enriched) Result construal: Trump, being unsympathetic to Pence’s
show of emotion, threw a tantrum as a result. But if the second reading is only
triggered by recognizing “that a speaker cannot be plausibly taken” to intend to
express the unenriched construal, we have no explanation for why that construal
is not only a plausible, but indeed salient, interpretation for the utterance.26
The crucial point is that cases that involve the apparent strengthening of
a conjunction meaning represent only a narrow subset of the full range of
inferences that result from the establishment of discourse coherence—inferences
that generally go well beyond what can be characterized as developments to the
logical form of an utterance, as we can see from reflecting on (40a–c):
(40) a. John is traveling to Paris. He wants to visit his family. (=24)
(Explanation)
b. The employee went to the store. He bought a bottle of scotch for the
office party. (=33) (Occasion)
c. Country singers sometimes sell more albums than your typical pop star.
Taylor Swift’s latest album sold 9 million copies. (Exemplification)
26The more recent analysis of coherence and pragmatic enrichment of Pagin [2014],
discussed briefly in fn. 28, suffers from the opposite problem: it predicts that such cases
will always be strengthened to a causal interpretation.
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As we noted in §3.2, there is more to establishing coherence in (40a) than the
inference that John is traveling to Paris because he wants to see his family. Here the
addressee will not be content to merely record the fact that some causal relationship
holds. Additional inferences are necessary to support this causal interpretation,
such as that his family is or will be in Paris, and that John intends to see them
during this particular trip. Needless to say, upon hearing (40a) an addressee
would be quite surprised to find out that John had no intention of seeing his family
during his trip, even though the passage never asserts that he does so intend.
Similarly, example (40b) supports an Occasion relation. Here the addressee will not
merely infer temporal progression among the events, but also infer that the scotch
was purchased at the store. An addressee presumably makes this enrichment
effortlessly, and perhaps without even noticing that the enriched content is not
stated explicitly. Finally, (40c) is an example of Exemplification. Let us suppose
the addressee doesn’t know much about the music industry nor who Taylor Swift
is. Assuming that the addressee recognizes and accepts the speaker’s intention to
trigger the recognition of Exemplification, reading this passage will then teach him
a few things that are not explicitly stated: that Taylor Swift is a country singer and
that 9 million copies of an album is more than what a typical pop star would sell.
These inferences are required if the proposition expressed by the second sentence
is to be understood as providing an example of the proposition expressed by the
first. All of the inferences discussed for these three examples are cases of pragmatic
enrichment, and all have coherence establishment as their source. Specifically,
they are inferences drawn in order to meet constraints imposed by the operative
coherence relation, and hence go well beyond inferring that a particular conjunction
should be given a ‘strengthened’ —e.g., temporal or causal— interpretation.
If, as we believe, these considerations suggest that attempts to understand
intersentential coherence in terms of the inventory of familiar pragmatic tools
are unlikely to succeed, this failure is unsurprising given the arguments of this
paper. For if the inferential mechanisms at work in the interpretation of eliciture
rest in processes of coherence establishment operative in both intersentential and
intrasentential settings, then it is predictable that cases involving intersentential
coherence should be just as resistant to explanation in terms of these familiar tools
as cases of intrasentential coherence (viz., eliciture).
4.2 Conversational Eliciture: Advances and Limitations
We close with an assessment of what we have and have not accomplished in our
discussion of eliciture. We began the paper with the goal of describing a process by
which extrasemantic content is conveyed that fails to fit neatly into any of the types
of pragmatic enrichment thus far described in the literature. We accomplished this
goal through an analysis of the properties of eliciture with respect to four questions
with which theories of enrichment have historically engaged (§1). First, in §§1–2 we
provided a characterization of the type of enrichment that results from the inference
of an eliciture, emphasizing its non-local character and distinguishing it from other,
more familiar, types of enrichment. Second, in §3 we identified those aspects of
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the hearer’s cognitive apparatus that a speaker exploits when constructing her
utterance so as to convey eliciture, specifically those capacities responsible for
establishing the coherence of intersentential discourse and of the world more
generally. Third, in §3 we characterized the nature of the inference processes
associated with that machinery for establishing coherence, that is, through the
satisfaction of constraints that are associated with particular types of coherence
relations. Finally, in §2.1 we argued that unlike many other types of enrichment, the
inference to eliciture is not triggered by any violation of communicative norms or
other felicity requirement on linguistic material, but instead results from more basic
and constantly operative cognitive machinery that serves up candidate inferences.
This result leaves us with a heterogeneous view of pragmatic enrichment, in which
eliciture takes its own place among a broad inventory of enrichment mechanisms
that speakers can rely on to make their linguistic contributions efficient while still
remaining expressive.
Having accomplished this, we want to be clear that there are limitations to
our account as well which, in turn, plausibly reflect principled limitations on the
possibility of systematic theorizing in pragmatics more generally. Specifically,
as with the other accounts of various types of enrichment surveyed in §2, the
account of §3 does not provide specific predictions about arbitrary cases and hence
cannot be regarded as a total, closed-form, predictive theory of the extrasemantic
enrichments it targets. But this shouldn’t be too surprising. Indeed, lessons from
the theory of coherence establishment across sentences suggest that an adequate
total theory of extrasemantic expansion would have to be sensitive to an apparently
unlimited range of facts that could turn out to be relevant to making the right
predictions about cases.27
It would need to predict, for example, that (41) doesn’t give rise to a causal
eliciture in ordinary contexts, but that it will in a context in which John is a
protective parent with a Bieber-fan daughter who also works for his company.
It would need to predict that, though an utterance of (42) strongly invites the
inference that the runner was running at the time of the accident if the conversants
take the victim to be an occasional/hobbyist runner, the invitation to that inference
is much weaker if they take the victim to be a professional runner—or, alternatively,
in a case where the string is uttered by one runner to another at a meeting of their
running club.
(41) John fired the employee who looks like Justin Bieber.
(42) A runner was hit by a car in Fresno last night.
And so on. Of course, our point is not that it is hard to imagine a proposal that
takes the specific considerations mentioned into account—particularly after they
have been highlighted. It is, rather, that it is hard to imagine a general proposal
27As Sperber and Wilson [1986] and others have noted, much the same is likely to be true
of the cases Grice would classify as particularized implicatures. Hence eliciture is far from
alone in this respect.
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—one that extends systematically to all cases— that takes into account (in advance)
whatever specific considerations turn out to be relevant to whether or not such
extrasemantic inferences go through.
What our analysis does do is explain an interesting class of expansions relative
to the establishment of coherence, which distinguishes it from the other types of
enrichment surveyed in §2. For example, our account is able to predict that
the causal eliciture will be drawn from (1a) if the hearer is able to construe the
components of that utterance as standing in an Explanation relation, and that an
occasion eliciture will be drawn from (3a) if he is able to construe the components
of that utterance as standing in an Occasion relation. Indeed, it allows similarly
conditional predictions about the hard cases raised above—viz., that a causal
eliciture is drawn from (41) given appropriate (presupposition-introducing, hence)
Explanation-supporting stipulations about John’s protectiveness toward his Bieber
fan daughter who works at his company, and that an Occasion eliciture is not
drawn from (42) given stipulations about the context that block or remove from
the common ground the general presuppositions required for the establishment of
Occasion. A direct consequence of this dependence of eliciture on the framework
for establishing coherence relations is that any account of the latter should also
advance considerably our understanding of the former. As is stands, however,
because there is no complete theory of coherence establishment on offer, and our
analysis proposes to understand eliciture in terms of coherence establishment, there
is necessarily no complete theory to offer for eliciture either.28
28 Some theorists who have addressed pragmatic enrichment via coherence establishment
have taken a more optimistic view of the prospects for a complete theory of this sort.
One such account is the INTERPRETATION AS ABDUCTION framework of Hobbs et al.
[1993], according to which interpreting sentences in discourse is viewed as the process of
inference to the best explanation of why the sentences would be true. Although the best
explanations will prove as much information deductively as possible, typically the proof
procedure will require the assumption of information that cannot be established deductively
from context and world knowledge. These assumptions yield pragmatic enrichments, such
as those that result from establishing coherence. Of course, the space of possible analyses
will be quite large (indeed, presumably infinite); hence Hobbs [2010] points to a set of
theoretical virtues as a metric for determining which explanation is best. Thus, he says,
cognition prefers short proofs over long ones, salient axioms over nonsalient ones, minimal
sets of assumptions, and exploitation of implicit redundancies. But none of these virtues
are well-understood, and certainly none are specified to the degree necessary to make
predictions about specific cases. Further, all are implementation-dependent; what proofs are
short or long, how many assumptions will be required for those proofs, how much particular
assumptions ‘cost’ to make, and so forth, will depend on the design decisions made during
the logical encoding of the knowledge base.
Similar concerns apply to Pagin’s (2014) analysis of coherence establishment and
pragmatic enrichment. Pagin defines five categories of coherence that are ordered by
increasing strength: VACUITY (no relation), CONTIGUITY (connected in time and/or space),
RESEMBLANCE (parallelism), POSSIBILITY (influence, e.g., enablement), and NECESSITY
(causality), with the idea being that free pragmatic enrichment occurs when it serves to
raise the degree of coherence with respect to this ordering. The problem is that, since it is
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5 Conclusion
The balance between expressivity and efficiency proposed by Zipf predicts that
speakers may, when appropriate, design their utterances to take advantage of the
hearer’s mental state and capacity for inference to communicate more than what
they explicitly say. The variety of ways in which they accomplish this has been
the focus of research on pragmatic enrichment for many years, starting with the
seminal work on implicature of Grice [1975], and following numerous others that
include Horn’s [1972] neo-Gricean revision to Grice’s system (which, famously,
engages Zipf’s opposition directly), Bach’s impliciture, various forms of local
pragmatic strengthening proposed by Levinson, Recanati, and others, and of course
Relevance Theory as an alternative to the Gricean picture. Various central questions
—including the character of the particular enrichments at hand, the aspects of
the hearer’s cognitive apparatus that a speaker exploits when constructing her
utterance so as to convey the enrichment, the details of the inference processes
used by the hearer to recover the enrichment, and the triggers responsible for the
hearer’s initiation of those inferential processes— have been at the heart of the
debate as the field moves toward a broader understanding of the ways in which
extrasemantic content is conveyed.
We have argued for the existence of a previously unidentified type of enrich-
ment —eliciture— that takes its place against this rich landscape. Whereas, like
implicature, our analysis engages intention recognition at the highest level, we
have taken pains to argue (§2) that eliciture differs from other types of enrichment
in key respects. Further, we contend that consideration of eliciture, and the
cognitive mechanisms we claim underpin its operation, highlights connections
between language understanding and other mental processes (§3), and holds
significant lessons about the prospects for systematic theories of extrasemantic
expansion (§4). For all these reasons, we believe there is much to be gained from
examining eliciture and consideration of its special properties.29
always possible to establish coherence between clauses if enough contextual information
is accommodated, a theory needs to tell us what the limits are. Pagin offers two principles
intended to answer this need: PLAUSIBILITY and SIMPLICITY. We will not belabor the point
here, but we doubt that defining these principles with enough precision to make predictions
about arbitrary cases will prove any easier than it will for Hobbs’s theoretical virtues.
Whereas the many degrees of freedom in both these accounts no doubt leave one able to
construct a story for particular examples post hoc, we see no reason to be optimistic that
these stories can be motivated independently of the examples they purportedly explain,
nor that the amalgamation of the analyses required for larger sets of examples would result
in a consistent knowledge base. Indeed, lessons learned from the evolution of artificial
intelligence research suggest just the opposite.
29For discussions and comments that have greatly improved the paper we are grateful
to Kent Bach, Betty Birner, Emma Borg, Ivano Caponigro, Michael Glanzberg, Jerry
Hobbs, Larry Horn, Chris Kennedy, Max Kölbel, Line Mikkelson, John MacFarlane, Peter
Pagin, Paul Pietroski, Chris Potts, François Recanati, Martin Schäfer, Josef Stern, Isidora
Stojanovic, Una Stojnic, Gregory Ward, and several anonymous referees; thanks also to
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